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 Recent active shooter events in our nation highlight the need for organizations to have 
comprehensive violence prevention/intervention plans in place. While much has been done to 
address violence in the workplace and on college campuses, K-12 schools have been slow to 
develop a comprehensive violence prevention/intervention curriculum for faculty, staff and 
students.  This project was completed to meet the needs of the Catholic Schools within the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  Research was conducted to determine the effectiveness of applying 
safety best practices from higher education and the workplace to the elementary, middle, and 
secondary education settings. The outcome of this project is an in-service curriculum for faculty 
and staff on threat assessment, threat management, physical security considerations, and 
imminent threat response practices.         
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Archdiocese of Milwaukee Teacher In-Service Safety Training Development 
Problem Statement 
On December 14, 2012, a gunman entered Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut and fatally shot 20 children and six adults before killing himself (Barron, 2012).  
This tragic incident sparked debate on everything from mental health care to gun control to 
arming teachers in the classroom (Swanson, 2013).  Recent active shooter events in our nation 
highlight the need for organizations to have comprehensive violence prevention/intervention 
plans in place.  
In 2009, Wisconsin Act 309 established laws mandating safety plans and training for 
every school in the state.  According to the statute, “Each school board and the governing body 
of each private school shall have in effect a school safety plan for each public or private school 
in the school district within 3 years of May 27, 2010” (Wisconsin Act 309, 2009).  Additionally, 
public and private schools are required to conduct safety drills two times a year based on the 
safety plan.      
 While much has been done in this area related to violence in the workplace and on 
college campuses, there is an increasingly urgent need for more concentration in K-12 schools.  
A review of literature and research related to active shooter incidents indicates that intervention 
and training, in conjunction with physical security and safety protocols, could greatly reduce the 
potential for violence, or the loss of life in a violent encounter. 
Catholic Schools in the Archdiocese of Milwaukee  
With an enrollment of more than 30,000 students, the Archdiocese of Milwaukee 
oversees 99 elementary and 14 high schools within 10 counties in Southeastern Wisconsin 
(Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2013).  Catholic schools in the Archdiocese of Milwaukee would 
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benefit immensely from a comprehensive curriculum to address potential violence and respond 
to imminent violence in a K-12 setting.  The schools within the Archdiocese of Milwaukee lack a 
comprehensive curriculum specifically designed to address potential violence and respond to an 
imminent threat of violence. The Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) provides 
several resources to public schools related to school safety (Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction, n.d.).  Unlike public schools in Wisconsin, the Catholic schools in the Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee do not have a centralized school board and are often governed by a sponsoring 
parish.  Oversight and guidance is given by the Archdiocese, but control and resources are 
allocated by a “local leadership team” (Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2013).  These “local 
leadership teams” often lack the expertise and resources needed to develop a practical and robust 
safety plan. 
Literature Review 
Threat Assessment and Management 
 After the mass shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University, media 
attention to campus safety was at an all-time high (Deisinger, Randazzo, O'Neill, & Savage, 
2008, p. 3).  Although not a new area of study, more focus began to be placed on threat 
assessment and management.  The idea of identifying and managing threats had been around for 
a number years. In fact, in 1997, ten years before the Virginia Tech shooting, the United States 
Postal Service issued the Threat Assessment Team Guide as “guidance to postal management in 
responding to and assessing the seriousness of potentially violent situations” (United States 
Postal Service, 1997).  Despite a reputation for an unusually high rate of workplace violence, the 
United States Postal Service Commission On A Safe and Secure Workplace found that “going 
postal” was a myth and that postal workers were no less likely to engage in violence than the 
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national workforce  (The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2000, p.1).   The 
Postal Service, however, led the way in developing threat assessment strategies.   
 In 2002, the United States Secret Service and Department of Education (2002) came 
together to create a guide to help schools carry out the Safe Schools Initiative by “adapting the 
threat assessment investigative process developed by the Secret Service to the problem of 
targeted school violence” (p. 4).   While the guide is focused on identifying students who might 
pose a threat, the principles of threat assessment can also be used to assess external threats if the 
proper notification and management protocols are put in place.  For instance, the guide explains 
that incidents of “targeted violence” are rarely sudden, impulsive acts and that people often knew 
about the attacker’s plan prior to the attack (United States Secret Service and United States 
Department of Education, 2002, p. 17).  This can also be applied to a domestic violence situation 
that has the potential to spill over into a school.   
 Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill and Savage (2008) suggest targeted violence can be 
prevented if early signs are recognized and a threat assessment team can intervene (p. 135).  
Communication between various parties is central to identifying and managing any threat.  
Information must be corroborated and put in context to determine if a person poses a threat.  It’s 
important to note that posing a threat is different than making a threat.  Someone who makes a 
threat could potentially be dangerous, but the act of making a threat alone does not necessarily 
indicate the person will become violent (United States Secret Service and United States 
Department of Education, 2002, p. 33).  The Safe School Initiative found in over 80% of the 
cases, the shooter did not directly make a threat before engaging in a school shooting, but did 
make known their intent (United States Secret Service and United States Department of 
Education, 2002).  School administrators need to develop a comprehensive threat assessment 
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policy that promotes communication within the school and between school administrators and 
law enforcement personnel.   
Most of the significant literature to date focuses on the workplace, college campuses, and 
internal threats in K-12 schools.  Elementary and high schools, especially private ones that lack 
centralized authority and resources, need to focus on how to identify and react to threats from 
outside the school as well.  They need to cultivate relationships with law enforcement and 
determine how to engage community resources like mental health care.  Universities, for 
instance, have large threat assessment and management teams that consist of law enforcement, 
faculty, student affairs, legal counsel, media relations, and mental health professionals 
(Deisinger, Randazzo, O'Neill, & Savage, 2008, p. 37).  Interdisciplinary teams like this are well 
equipped to assess and deal with a potential threat once it has been identified.  Most Catholic 
schools do not have these resources, so they must make extra effort to engage with resources in 
their communities when a potential threat comes to their attention.    
Physical Security Considerations    
Renewed emphasis has also been placed on physically securing our nation’s schools.  
Experts recommended that school districts install self-locking, automatically closing doors to 
classrooms and multiple cameras around the schools (Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012, p. 15). The 
idea is to keep people intent on causing harm out of the building or, as a last resort, out of the 
individual classrooms if they do get in. Turning elementary schools into fortresses, however, is 
neither practical nor desirable.  The cost of facility upgrades and ongoing maintenance can 
quickly become unmanageable for school districts that are already struggling with tight budgets 
and limited resources. Additionally, almost any physical security feature a school employs can 
still be circumvented by a determined gunman.  Children will still go out for recess and parents 
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and visitors will still be allowed in schools during the school day.  Aside from airport-like 
screening at every school and an impenetrable wall surrounding the school grounds, there is no 
fool-proof way to keep those wishing to cause people harm out of the building.   
One aspect of physical security that could benefit schools, however, would be the concept 
known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).  The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) is currently studying how principles of CPTED can be used to 
reduce violence in schools.  These CPTED principles include 
• creating a warm and welcoming environment, 
• fostering a sense of physical and social order, 
• creating a sense of ownership by students, 
• sending positive messages to students, 
• maximizing the presence of authority figures, 
• minimizing opportunities for out-of-sight activities, and 
• managing access to all school areas (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2013). 
Implementing all of these principles sends a message that the school may not be a desirable 
target for criminal activity.  The CDC suggests schools use the CPTED School Assessment 
(CSA) (Appendix D) to evaluate the grounds, buildings, and interiors (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2013).  While environmental design may not necessarily impact the 
motives of a determined shooter, they could have an impact if a gunman is randomly selecting a 
target. 
 School administrators need to determine which physical security features meet their 
needs and their budgets.  When securing a school, administrators cannot use a one-size-fits-all 
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approach.  What may be appropriate for one school, may not work another.  While schools need 
to be secured, a fortress mentality is usually not an environment that is conducive to learning.  
Active Shooter/Imminent Threat Response 
 The Department of Homeland Security (2013) defines an active shooter as “an individual 
actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined space and populated area; 
active shooters use firearms and there is no pattern or method to selection of their victims” (p. 3).  
Both police and civilian guidance for responding to an active shooter has changed throughout the 
years.  Prior to the 1999 shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado, police first responders 
were trained to form a perimeter and wait for a tactical response to resolve the situation (Buerger 
& Buerger, 2010, p. 1).  This gave the two shooters a significant amount of time to kill 12 
students and one teacher in the building (Lamb, 2008).   
Today, police responding to an active shooter incident are trained to enter the building, 
locate, and stop the shooter (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013, p. 6).  Training for 
civilians has also evolved in active shooter incidents.  Before the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, most people were taught to comply with a gunman (Center for Personal Protection and 
Safety, 2008).  The idea was that a gunman’s intent was usually to take hostages and use them as 
leverage.  The active shooter, however, like the plane hijackers on 9/11, has the sole intent of 
killing as many people as possible.  Because of this, current guidance to personnel in workplaces 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013, p. 4) and universities (Center for Personal 
Protection and Safety, 2008) teach variations on the “Run Hide Fight” method of surviving an 
active shooter incident that was recently introduced by the City of Houston (2012).   
The “Run Hide Fight” method teaches people to get out of a building if possible, to hide 
in a secure location if getting out is not possible, and to actively confront the gunman as a last 
IN-SERVICE SAFETY TRAINING DEVELOPMENT 7 
resort (City of Houston, 2012).  The idea behind “run,” or evacuation, is that it is better to not be 
in a building where a gunman is shooting.  If someone has a clear route to escape the building, 
and is sure they will not encounter the shooter, it is advisable to get out as quickly as possible.  If 
evacuating the building is not possible, then the next best option is to hide in a secure location 
until law enforcement arrives and can stop the shooter.  This involves locking or barricading a 
door, turning off the lights, and spreading out if there are multiple people in the room (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013, p. 5). Finally, as a last resort, the Department of 
Homeland Security (2013) gives the option of “taking action against the shooter” (p. 5).  This 
final guidance of “fight” assumes that all other options have failed and there is a strong 
likelihood that your life is in imminent danger if you do not take action.  
Despite the recent trends in active shooter response, K-12 schools have been slow to 
adopt this guidance.  A review of the literature about school safety suggests that the most 
common way schools train to respond to an active shooter event is through “lockdowns.”  While 
Kingshott and McKenzie (2013) do acknowledge that teachers and administrators are “first 
responders on the scene” when an emergency or crisis of any kind happens they advise school 
staff not take any “reactive measures” because their role is simply to initiate the contingency 
plan and then “assess and advise” until law enforcement arrives (p. 224).   
Buerger and Buerger (2010) assert that school safety plans need to be flexible enough to 
account for “broad categories of incidents” (p. 1). They also point out that students are not 
always in their classroom and that a “robust active-shooter protocol must encompass outdoor 
recess, lunch time groupings in the cafeteria, assemblies, and transition times” (Buerger & 
Buerger, 2010, p. 3).  In the scenarios mentioned evacuation from the building or area might be 
the best option.   
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In some cases, confronting the shooter might be the best option if evacuation is not 
possible.  In a situation where an active shooter has trapped people and there is nowhere to go 
and nowhere to hide, the Department of Homeland Security (2013) advises, “As a last resort, and 
only if your life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter” 
(p. 5).  This is basic self-defense.  If someone is actively engaged in shooting, you have to 
assume that the shooter’s intention is to cause as many casualties as possible.  If an individual is 
face to face with an active shooter, current guidance suggests that his or her best chance at 
survival and helping others survive might be to attack the shooter (Center for Personal Protection 
and Safety, 2008).   
Some reasons why schools have been slow to accept the concept of “Run Hide Fight” and 
train teachers in this type of response include legitimate concern that teachers and students will 
either not retain the information in a stressful situation, or perhaps not apply the concepts 
correctly. This could result in causing more harm and possibly unnecessary death (Dorn & 
Satterly, 2012).  The concern is certainly a valid one, but ignores the fact that doing nothing 
could also result in death when face to face with an active shooter. Buerger and Buerger (2010) 
suggest that schools need to develop a “more robust response” strategy because hiding out and 
waiting for police may not be the best option (p. 4). 
One of the biggest issues present for the trainer when providing active shooter response 
training for elementary school teachers is the reluctance of the teachers to implement the training 
they receive.  Alba and Gable (2012) identified several additional barriers in a study they 
conducted, explaining why elementary schools seem to be behind in adopting best practices in 
responding to an active shooter. Those barriers included disagreements between first responders 
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and school district personnel, communication issues, and a lack of clarity on proper response 
procedures (2012, p. 45).  
With the obvious exception of prevention of an incident, training faculty and staff to 
respond effectively to an active shooter incident is possibly the best way to reduce casualties.  
School safety professionals continue to debate what this training should consist of and how it 
should be implemented (Andersen, Hueston, & McCaleb, 2012).  While the research is lacking 
on the effectiveness of employing current workplace and campus guidance for responding to an 
active shooter in an elementary school setting, the literature suggests several reasons to try 
implementing some version of “Run Hide Fight.” Training programs on lockdown procedures 
are based on the assumption that there is a room with a door that can be secured.  The reality is 
students and teachers may not always be in that type of room when someone starts shooting.  
Given this obvious fact, it only makes sense to give teachers and administrators more training on 
other options so they can make the best decision to keep their students safe.    
Further research is needed to gauge the effectiveness of an active shooter response 
training curriculum.  As more schools adopt the training model already present in workplaces 
and on college campuses, more opportunities to get feedback from teachers on the practicality of 
the training will likely arise, allowing for even better responses to be formed, with more 
advanced training.  Hopefully teachers will never have to use any of the training, but if they are 
ever in an active shooter incident, the skills they learn might save their own lives and those of the 
children in their care. 
Emergency Management & Contingency Planning 
School safety plans need to account for multiple hazards as part of the emergency 
management and contingency planning process.  School administrators should draw on historical 
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data from their community to determine what threats and hazards the school might face (U.S. 
Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and 
Healthy Students, 2013, p. 7).  Including subject-matter experts from law enforcement, fire, and 
emergency medical services, and local emergency management is beneficial to this process.  In 
most schools, a “contingency plan” for an active shooter consists of protocols for a lockdown 
only (Buerger & Buerger, 2010, p. 1).   One study of a large school district in the Midwest found 
that while more than 80% of the school staff had participated in a fire drill and lockdown 
exercises, only about 30% had participated in an evacuation drill in the past year (Kingshott & 
McKenzie, 2013, p. 232).  It should be noted that an evacuation procedure would also be used 
for non-active shooter threats like a gas leak or chemical spill. 
Since a critical incident at any school would require a multi-agency response including 
police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and perhaps federal law enforcement, schools 
would be advised to base their safety plan on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
and the Incident Command System (ICS) models.  According to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), “NIMS provides a consistent framework for incident 
management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the 
incident” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011).  NIMS does not dictate a specific 
response to an incident, but rather how to respond based on the size and complexity of the 
incident.  ICS specifies the organizational structure responding agencies should follow to ensure 
functional command structure.  Utilizing NIMS and ICS allows for seamless interagency 
cooperation during an incident and maximizes the efficiency of resources (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2011).  Kingshot and McKenzie (2013) explain the six major components 
of NIMS: 
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• Command and management: This includes the incident command system, 
multiagency coordination systems, and public information systems. 
• Preparedness: This includes planning, training, exercises, personnel qualifications, 
equipment acquisitions, mutual aid, and publications management. 
• Resource management: This includes the steps required to describe, request, 
mobilize, track, and recover resources used during the incident response. 
• Communications and information management: This includes radios, pagers, and 
protocols used to ensure that key personnel get the information they need. 
• Supporting technologies: This includes voice and data communication systems. 
• Ongoing management and maintenance: This provides oversight and review of NIMS 
to improve and refine systems (pp. 227-228).  
While the language of NIMS and ICS may seem foreign to someone who is not a first 
responder, it is a common language that all responders understand.  Since many of the agencies 
that may respond to an emergency at a school may not work together on a regular basis, it is 
critical for everyone to use the same terminology.  While school personnel will not be engaged in 
a tactical response, they could be called upon to support the response in any number of functions 
in the ICS structure.  School administrators should be familiar with NIMS and ICS for this 
reason.   
Methodology 
 A review of a sampling of school safety plans from schools within the Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee indicates an urgent need for a curriculum specific to K-12 schools to assist 
administrators with violence prevention and intervention training.  Following the presentation of 
a pilot training program to 42 principals from Catholic schools within the Archdiocese, this 
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researcher solicited feedback from the Catholic Education Leadership Institute.  Among the 
needs identified by Institute staff was assistance with development, review and training of a 
safety plan.  The in-service training program curriculum developed for this research project 
incorporates extensive research on threat assessment/management, physical security 
considerations, emergency management, and imminent threat response practices.   
Conclusion 
 When this author began this project in January of 2013, very little guidance existed on 
how schools should respond to an active shooter incident.  While the federal Safe School 
Initiative provided schools with a wealth of information on identifying and managing potential 
threats, nothing in the guide addressed the important issue of how to respond to an active shooter 
event in progress.  It is good to know that one of the outcomes of the shootings at Columbine 
High School was a greater focus on prevention, but responding to violence in our nation’s 
schools must utilize a holistic, research-based approach.   
 In June 2013, the U.S. Department of Education (ED), U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), released the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency 
Operations Plans.  In many respects, the guide reflects what this author has done by taking 
active shooter response best practices from law enforcement and the private sector and applying 
them to the K-12 environment.  While the focus of the guide is on creating a school safety plan, 
or emergency operations plan (EOP), it also provides guidance on threat assessment and 
management, physical security, active shooter/imminent threat response, and recovery.  These 
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areas are guided by Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8, which defines preparedness around 
the five “mission areas”:  
• Prevention – the action schools take to prevent a threatened or actual incident from 
occurring. 
• Protection – securing schools against acts of violence and manmade or natural 
disasters.  
• Mitigation – eliminating or reducing the loss of life and property damage by lessening 
the impact of an event or emergency. 
• Response – stabilizing an emergency once it has happened or is certain to happen in 
an unpreventable way. 
• Recovery – assisting schools affected by an emergency or event in restoring the 
learning environment (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and 
Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013, p. 2).  
Much of this effort on a national level is a result of renewed focus on school safety following the 
December 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School.  That event demonstrated that 
security measures and threat assessment (prevention and protection) alone are not sufficient.  A 
safety plan, or EOP, must also address the areas of mitigation, response, and recovery.  
Comprehensive prevention planning and mitigation cannot account for everything. School staff 
must be prepared to respond to any number of emergency situations.   
 The result of this research project is the development of a training program for Catholic 
school faculty, staff, and administrators within the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  The three-hour 
training session is meant to be held annually, preferably at the beginning of the school year. Four 
45-minute units cover threat assessment/management, physical security, active shooter/imminent 
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threat response, and emergency management/contingency planning.  It is important that all 
employees who work at the school receive this training.  Everyone is responsible for the safety 
and security of the children in the school and everyone should contribute to the planning process.  
Following this training, participants should have a general understanding of the topics covered.  
More training is recommended on specific areas related to a participant’s job description.  For 
instance, principals and vice principals would benefit from receiving additional training related 
to incident management and threat assessment since they would likely be heavily involved in 
those areas.  Maintenance personnel should receive further training on physical security, 
especially principles of CPTED.  All school personnel should participate in scenario-based safety 
drills that incorporate a number of different hazards.   
As was stated previously, it is very important to leverage the experience and expertise of 
first responders in the community throughout the safety planning, training, and review process.  
Great progress has been made in the field of threat assessment, prevention, response, and 
mitigation. While there is obviously more work to be done, schools must take advantage of the 
research and training that already exists to ensure a safer learning environment.  
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Appendix B: Instructor Outline 
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Appendix C: In-Service Handout 
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